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different types of survey biases, the article argues that self-selection and misreporting are the most 
critical problems for legislative surveys. In order to identify the self-selection and misreporting biases, 
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in the parliament. The empirical analysis shows that the survey sample has a substantial misreporting 
bias. We conclude that the parliamentarian’s attitude towards the survey object is strongly linked to 
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1 Introduction 
Surveys belong to the most popular research methods in legislative studies (Bailer, 
2014). Legislative surveys are particularly well established in Europe, while studies 
on the US Congress rather focus on the analysis of roll call vote data. In the age of big 
data, more and more information is available about Members of Parliaments’ (MPs) 
behavior. However, legislative behavior is often best understood by means of 
surveys, particularly when doing large comparative analyses. Surveys do not only 
provide information on the intention of MPs, but they also allow for drawing more 
wide ranging inferences by increasing the number of participants.  
In the last couple of years, several studies have conducted surveys in order to 
study legislative behavior (Aelst, Sehata, Dalen, 2010; Kam et al., 2010; Martin, 2010; 
Bowler and Farrell, 2011; Zucco and Lauderdale, 2011; Arnold, 2012; Scully, Hix and 
Farrell, 2012; Bailer et al., 2013; Deschouwer and Depauw, 2014; Bütikofer and Hug, 
2015). Although legislative surveys are vulnerable to several methodological 
problems, they are rarely ever validated (Groves et al., 2011; Fowler Jr., 2013). In 
contrast to legislative studies, the validation of survey data is well established in 
other research areas, e.g. postelection studies (Comşa and Postelnicu, 2013; Selb and 
Munzert, 2013; Sciarini and Goldberg, 2015; Sciarini and Goldberg, 2016). These 
studies show that survey data tends to be biased. Similar problems are likely to 
populate legislative surveys. Krumpal (2013, 2027-2028) argues that social 
desirability is especially developed when the answer is sensitive. Since MPs are 
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especially aware of public opinion, they may be tempted to misreport due to social 
desirability. Hence, this article illustrates the methodological challenges of surveys in 
legislative research. In doing so, the article argues that self-selection and 
misreporting are the main issues when conducting a legislative survey and illustrates 
how relevant those effects are and that the attitude towards the object of inquiry has 
a main influence on survey results.  
This article performs a triangulation in order to identify the effects of self-
selection and misreporting. Concretely, we take advantage of two different data 
sources to assess survey reported and validated behavior of MPs: On the one hand, 
we carried out a survey about MPs’ demand for policy evaluation. In the survey, 
MPs were asked if they had submitted a request in order to evaluate the 
implementation or impact of a public policy6. In addition, such parliamentary request 
are also important for MPs who wants to fulfill their oversight function and control 
the government. On the other hand, we performed a content analysis of all MPs’ 
parliamentary interventions to determine if the respondent’s behavior was consistent 
with their answers. By comparing the self-reported and validated behavioral data, 
we are able to estimate the survey bias. The analysis shows that the survey sample is 
not affected by a self-selection bias, but the responses by misreporting. A 
comparative analysis suggests that the findings based on the survey systematically 
 
 
6 See survey item in Appendix (Table 6). 
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overestimate the effects of exogenous variables. As a consequence, the sample should 
be adjusted. 
This article is structured as follows. First, section 2 discusses the advantages 
and the methodological challenges of legislative surveys. Section 3 introduces both 
data sources – the reported data from the survey and the validated data from the 
content analysis. Section 4 presents different models, which explain the over- and 
underreporting of the parliamentary demand for evaluations. In addition, a 
comparison between data sets shows the consequences of a biased survey sample for 
models that explain MPs’ behavior. Section 5 concludes by discussing the relevance 
of the findings for legislative research.  
 
2 Legislative Surveys: An Opportunity with Challenges 
Surveys are a useful tool to collect information on MPs. This technique offers two key 
advantages. First, surveys are relatively fast and inexpensive to conduct, particularly 
when performed online. While researchers may interview the MPs personally or 
send them a questionnaire by mail, scholars can also simply send MPs an invitation 
to an online-survey to their official email address. In this way, MPs can choose a 
suitable time for them in order to answer the questions, and interviewer effects are 
almost inexistent (Bailer, 2014, 177). Second, surveys generate data that otherwise 
would not be available. MPs’ behavior is generally well documented, but the 
motivation behind this behavior often remains unknown. Research projects regularly 
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require the collection of latent information that is not readily or publicly available. 
Hence, researchers often have no alternative but directly to ask questions to MPs in 
order to produce manifest data. While in many scenarios interviews would also 
allow the collection of latent information, surveys bear the important advantage of 
being often more resource-effective. 
The advantages of surveys are indisputable. However, surveys often entail 
challenges that have to be dealt with. Since surveys often rely on samples and do not 
have a full response rate, the responding sample is rarely equal to the population of 
interest. Bethlehem (2010, 163-165) has presented a taxonomy of survey biases 
(Figure 1). In doing so, he distinguishes between sampling biases and non-sampling 
biases. Sampling biases can be traced back to the sampling, since the estimation is 
based on a sample and not on the entire population. Two different types of biases are 
based on sampling biases. While estimation biases denote the effect caused by using 
a random selection procedure, self-selection bias occurs when the true selection 
probability differs from the selection probability specified in the sampling design. 
Non-sampling biases are the type of biases that are not related to the sample. 
Bethlehem further distinguishes between observation and non-observation biases. 
On the one hand, observation biases refer to biases made during the data collection 
and take different forms: Over-coverage biases are made when units are included in 
the survey, which do not belong to the population of interest. Misreporting arises 
when a respondent does not want to give the accurate answer, when the respondent 
fails to give the accurate answers or when the respondent does not understand the 
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question. Moreover, misreporting can also be caused by a lack of interest or an 
intention to provide a certain image. Processing biases are made during data 
processing (e.g. during data entry to a database). On the other hand, non-observation 
biases are either under-coverage biases or missing biases. Under-coverage occurs 
when members of the population of interest are not invited to participate. Missing 
biases refer to situations in which the respondents do not provide the required 
information.  
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Survey Biases  
 
(Adopted from Bethlehem, 2010, 164) 
 
Legislative Surveys are a special form of survey, since they differ from other surveys 
such as household panels or postelection surveys. As a kind of elite surveys, they are 
shaped by special circumstances. We argue that two types of biases are of particular 
interest for legislative surveys. First, amongst the sampling biases is the self-selection 
bias more likely to appear than an estimation bias, since a legislative survey relies 
(usually) on an exhaustive sample. The sample is usually defined as the number of 
Total Survey Bias Sampling Bias Estimation Bias 
Self-Selection Bias 
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Missing Bias 
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seats in the parliament. Since the numbers are relatively small, it is often not 
necessary to draw a sample from all MPs. Second, amongst the non-sampling biases, 
misreporting is the biggest challenge. While processing biases are highly dependent 
on the quality of the research, over- and under coverage are unlikely due to the 
defined sample. Missing biases are not specific to legislative studies and they are 
well discussed in survey research (Little, 1988; Little and Rubin, 2014). However, the 
MPs responses can be highly biased when their reported information is not accurate. 
Both self-selection and misreporting bias have two components: random and 
systematic bias. While the former is only problematic for standard errors, the latter is 
in addition problematic for the estimated values. Given the main challenges faced by 
legislative surveys, we focus in the following sections on self-selection and 
misreporting and illustrate how they may influence survey results. 
 
2.1 Self-selection Bias 
The first challenge for every survey is to obtain a sufficient number of participants, as 
a high response rate is helpful to generate a non-selective sample. A high response 
rate often produces a more representative database than a lower one. In the last 
couple of years, rates of self-selection have generally increased (Brick and Williams 
2013, 36; Massey and Tourangeau, 2013, 222) – this trend can also be observed for 
surveys among MPs (Bailer, 2014, 178). 
Self-selection can have a strong influence on the viability of the data. 
Consequently, the likelihood of MPs to participate in a survey is important. Groves 
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and Couper (2012), as well as Groves, Singer and Corning (2000) argue that single 
attributes of the survey may highly influence whether the invited person participates 
in the survey or not. In the leverage-salience theory, the decision to participate is 
dependent on the “leverage” of some attributes, to which the invited persons assign 
a different salience. When an attribute has a great leverage on the decision to 
participate for many invited persons, the sample is likely to have a self-selection bias 
(Groves and Peytcheva, 2008, 169).  
 
2.2 Misreporting Bias 
If the invited persons have participated in the survey, the next challenge is to find 
out whether they have answered the questions accurately. Misreporting is either 
possible when the MP does not want to give the accurate answer or when he cannot 
give the true answer because he or she is not able to do it. Both result in the over- and 
underreporting of the accurate behavior. Overreporting occurs when a MP claims an 
action or belief that he or she did not undertake or share. In contrast, underreporting 
occurs when a MP neglects an action or belief, although he or she truly undertook or 
shares it. According to Belli et al. (1999, 90-91), two different sources of misreporting 
are discussed in literature: social desirability and memory failure. While social 
desirability indicates the tendency of a respondent to answer in a most social 
acceptable way (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960; DeMaio, 1984; Tourangeau and Yan, 
2007), memory failure refers to the situation in which the respondent cannot 
remember an event (Groves et al., 2011).  
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Social desirability and memory failure are both linked to overreporting and 
underreporting (Groves et al. 2011, 218). Nevertheless, the reasons behind 
underreporting are much less clear. The literature simply suggests that respondents 
may underreport when the action or behavior is embarrassing or socially undesirable, 
as well as when there is a mismatch between the respondent’s and the survey’s 
understanding of the question (Tourangeau et al., 1997; Martin, 1999).  
Jackman (1999, 9-14) has formally defined the bias from self-selection and 
misreporting. First, he denotes that the survey estimate of x is not based on a full 
sample, but on the respondents’ sample. The estimation from the respondents subset 
is denoted x(r) and the value of x among the non-respondents x(~ r) (each with weights r 
and (1 – r)):  
x = rx(r) + (1 – r)x(~ r) + ϵ, (1) 
where ϵ denotes the error term due to sampling (which is in most of the cases for 
legislative surveys E(ϵ) = 0). Second, he denotes the attributes x that increases the 
probability to participate in the survey in general (e.g. knowledge or interest in the 
topic of the study), when x(r) ≥ x ≥ x(~ r). The difference between the survey 
respondents and the non-respondents are reflected in the following model: 
x( ~r) = ωx(r), 0 < ω ≤ 1, (2) 
where ω is a non-response deflation parameter. Third, the measurement problem can 
be formulated with the difference between the true rate of x among respondents, x(r) 
and the observed rate !(r). Thus, misreporting can be formulated as  
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x(r) = η!(r) (3) 
Finally, we obtain the total bias of self-selection and misreporting when we substitute 
both equations (2) and (3) in equation (1):  
x = rx(r) + (1 – r)x(~ r) + ϵ = + (1 – r)ωη!(r) + rη!(r) + ϵ 
  = !(r)η(r + ω + rω) + ϵ 
 
(4) 
The next section introduces the data and the methods that we use in order to 
demonstrate the bias for self-selection and misreporting for legislative studies.  
 
3 Data and Methods 
In order to analyze the biases of legislative surveys, we will compare the responses of 
a legislative survey with validated MP behavior. In doing so, we supplement the 
ParlEval survey dataset (Eberli et al. 2014) with data of parliamentary interventions 
obtained by means of web scraping. The ParlEval survey was conducted amongst the 
cantonal and federal MPs in Switzerland in 2014. In total, 1570 MPs participated in 
the survey; this corresponds with a response rate of 55.3%.7 Since we only analyze 
the federal level, we will use the responses of 112 members of the Federal Assembly 
(45.7% response rate). Both response rates are relatively high for legislative surveys 
in Switzerland (Brun and Siegel, 2006; Bütikofer, 2014; Deschouwer and Depauw, 
2014; Feh Widmer, 2014; Strebel, 2014).  
 
 
7 For methodological issues, see Bundi et al. (2014).  
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The analysis in this paper validates the MPs’ responses to the survey with MPs’ 
behavior in terms of demand for policy evaluation. Evaluation requests are 
particularly useful for MPs because they provide evidence for legislative decision-
making and help MPs to fulfill their oversight function towards the government 
(Jacob et al., 2015; Bundi 2016). Since MPs demand often evaluations by means of 
parliamentary interventions, the comparison of reported (survey responses) and 
validated data (submitted interventions) offers an optimal basis to estimate the 
effects of biases on the survey responses. In the survey, MPs reported whether they 
have requested policy evaluations by means of parliamentary interventions during 
the last four years (i.e., 1 March 2010 – 20 June 2014). In order to compare MPs’ 
reported demand for evaluation8 with the actual MPs’ behavior, we have collected 
data on parliamentary interventions. In doing so, we have only included 
parliamentary interventions, which were issued by individual MPs. All the types of 
parliamentary interventions available to federal MPs (questions, interpellations, 
postulates, motions and parliamentary initiatives) introduced in the four years 
previous to the survey were downloaded from the Swiss Parliament website9 and 
stored in a database.  
During the four-year period mentioned above, 9’203 interventions were 
introduced by MPs, parliamentary groups, and committees. In order to identify 
 
 
8 As MPs may have a broad understanding of what an evaluation is, the survey introduced a 
definition in its introduction: "In this survey, evaluations are interpreted as studies, reports or other 
documents, which assess a state’s measure in a systematic and transparent way with respect to their 
effectiveness, efficiency or fitness for purpose." 
9 http://www.parlament.ch/f/dokumentation/curia-vista/Pages/default.aspx [13.5.2015] 
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parliamentary interventions representing demands for policy evaluation we 
performed a keyword search10 on their title and full text. Following this procedure, 
271 parliamentary interventions were identified and read in their entirety by one of 
the authors. This coder identified 20 “false positives” (i.e., presence of the keywords 
but no actual reference to policy evaluations).  
The following analysis will model the reported submission of parliamentary 
interventions with a two-step model. First, MPs have to participate in the survey 
before they can (mis)report about their parliamentary interventions on policy 
evaluation. Some variables may affect both survey participation and misreporting. 
Moreover, the sample could be biased by self-selection and unobservable factors 
such as memory failure or social desirability. Thus, a Heckman (1979) model is 
estimated in order to correct for selection. If the error terms of both equations are 
correlated (for survey participation and over- and underreporting), then the second 
equation has to be biased (over- and underreporting).  
Dubin and Rivers (1989) as well as Sartori (2003) have adapted Heckman’s 
model for binary dependent variables. The equation for the auxiliary latent variables 
!!!∗  is 
!!!∗ =  !′!!!! + !!!  , (5) 
 
 
10 The official version of parliamentary interventions in French was used. The keyword search was 
based on regular expressions for the following terms in French: evaluation, meta-evaluation, 
effectiveness, efficiency, legislative impact, regulatory impact, impact analysis, cost-benefit, cost 
advantage, cost-utility, outcomes and performance analysis. 
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where !!!∗  is the underlying probability to participate in the survey of an individual i 
with their explanatory variables !!!  and the error term !!! . In a situation with 
nonrandom selection, the equations for the selection models are 
!!! =  
0 !" !!!∗ < 0
1 !" !!!∗ ≥ 0 
(6) 
!!! =  
0 !" !!!∗ < 0
1 !" !!!∗ ≥ 0 
 (7) 
where !!! is the observed dependent variable for survey participation and !!! the 
dependent variable for over- or underreporting. The Heckman model estimates the 
likelihood to misreporting and takes the probability of the survey participation into 
account.  
In order to analyze MPs’ survey participation, we include several variables. 
Based on the leverage-salience theory, we assume that MPs that have actually 
submitted a parliamentary intervention to demand policy evaluation are more likely 
to participate in the survey than the other MPs, since this attribute may have great 
leverage on the survey participation. In addition, we include several variables that 
might influence the survey participation of a parliamentarian (gender, age, language 
and parliamentary group).11 The models that analyze the over- and underreporting 
will include legislative professionalism and MPs’ attitude towards evaluations. First, 
the degree of professionalization is an important MPs’ attribute (Squire, 1992, 2007). 
Since the membership in the Federal Assembly is only a secondary appointment, the 
 
 
11 The attitude towards evaluation should also be included in the participation model. However, since 
we do not have the data for all MPs, we cannot include this variable in our models. As a consequence, 
we use the other variables as proxies.  
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amount of time for the parliamentary mandate differs significantly amongst the 
parliamentarians (Kriesi, 2001; Bailer, 2011).12 Second, the MPs’ attitude towards 
evaluations can influence the over- and underreporting of an evaluation demand, 
since the attitude towards evaluations plays an important role when dealing with 
evaluations (Johnson et al., 2009).  
Subsequently, an analysis of the MP’s likelihood to demand an evaluation is 
reconstructed from Bundi (2016) in order to demonstrate the bias effects of the 
survey. In doing so, several variables that may influence the parliamentary demand 
for evaluations are included in the model (gender, age, bureaucratic drift, 
professionalization, attitude towards evaluations, parliament experience, 
membership in a oversight committee, and membership in the parliament board).13  
 
4 Results 
4.1 Representativeness of the Survey 
A survey sample does not only rely on a reasonable response rate, but also on 
whether it represents the object of investigation. In order to control for such a self-
selection bias, we have compared the participants of the survey with all invited MPs 
regarding different characteristics.  
 
 
12  In the Swiss context, professionalization is widely understood as the time spent for the 
parliamentary mandate. We define the legislative professionalism as the time spent for the MPs 
mandate, in percentage of a full-time appointment.  
13 The operationalization is summarized in Table 6 in the Appendix. 
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The four parties Swiss People’s Party, Social Democratic Party, FDP.The 
Liberals, and Christian Democratic People’s Party combine the most MPs in the 
parliament and are reasonably represented in the survey (80.4% in the survey to 
80.8% in the parliament). The two pole parties are responsible for the highest 
deviation: While party members of the Swiss People’s Party are underrepresented, 
the MPs of the Social Democratic Party are overrepresented. Concerning the gender, 
the sample is relatively balanced, even if more female MPs participated than their 
male colleagues. The same is true for the language of the MPs, as German-speaking 
MPs are slightly underrepresented (68.8% to 72.2%). Moreover, the participated MPs 
do not vary strongly from the invited MPs regarding their age. Although we observe 
that younger and older MPs participated more often than their middle-aged 
colleagues from 50 to 64 years. As a consequence, MPs with a parliament seniority 
between 8 and 11 years are underrepresented in the survey sample (13.4% to 18.0%). 
In contrast, almost no differences can be observed regarding the committee 
memberships and the number of parliamentary interventions, which were submitted 
by the MPs. Hence, we conclude that the survey sample overall represents the 
investigated parliament quite well.14 
4.2 Self-Selection and Misreporting Bias of the Survey 
The self-selection bias is measured with a comparison between the validated 
evaluation demand of survey participants and non-participants. Table 1 shows that 
 
 
14 An overview of the general self-selection bias is shown in Table 7 in the Appendix.  
 
  16 
the participants and non-participants do not differ systematically in their demand for 
evaluations. A majority of both groups (about 66%) have indicated that they have 
never submitted a parliamentary intervention in order to demand an evaluation. 
Moreover, the share of MPs that have submitted an evaluation demand several times 
is slightly higher amongst the survey non-participants than the participants (15.8% to 
13.4%). MPs that have submitted an evaluation demand did not participate in the 
survey more frequently. Thus, the data suggests with an overall self-selection bias of 
1.4% that there is no systematic self-selection bias in the survey sample.  
Table 1: Self-selection Bias: Validated Data of the Parliamentary Demand for Evaluations (Frequency) 
 Never Once Several times Total 
Participated in the Survey 74 (66.1%) 23 (20.5%) 15 (13.4%) 112 
Not Participated in the Survey 86 (64.7%) 26 (19.6%) 21 (15.8%) 133 
Total Self-selection Bias 1.4% 0.9% 2.4% 1.4% 
Note: The total self-selection bias within each column is estimated by the difference between the 
participations and the non-participations of the survey. The overall self-selection bias is estimated by 
the addition of all self-selection biases and is weighted for the number of MPs15. 
In order to estimate the misreporting bias, we compare the reported data with 
the validated data of the survey participants (Table 2).16 According to the survey, 
22.7% of MPs have reported that they have submitted a parliamentary intervention 
 
 
15 Usually, the Swiss Federal Assembly consists of 246 MPs (200 lower chamber and 46 upper 
chamber). However, during the time of the survey, a seat in the upper chamber was vacant (Eberli et 
al. 2014).  
16 We excluded the parliamentarians who answered the question whether they have submitted a 
parliamentary intervention in order to demand evaluation with “Don’t know” (N=8) and “No answer” 
(N=7). As a consequence, the survey sample reduced from 112 to 97.  
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demanding an evaluation once, while 33.0% reported to have done it several times. 
Here the reported data differs significantly from the validated data. Although the 
percentage of MPs who submitted a parliamentary intervention once is roughly 
equivalent, 33.0% of MPs have reported to demand an evaluation several times, but 
only 13.4% actually did. In addition, fewer MPs reported to have demanded an 
evaluation (44.3% vs. 68.0%). Since the overall misreporting bias is 18.7%, we 
conclude that there is a misreporting bias in the survey sample.  
Table 2: Misreporting Bias: Difference between Validated and Reported Data of the Parliamentary Demand for 
Evaluations of the Survey Participants (Frequency) 
 Never Once Several Times Total 
Reported Data  43 (44.3%) 22 (22.7%) 32 (33.0%) 97 
Validated Data 66 (68.0%) 18 (18.6%) 13 (13.4%) 97 
Total Misreporting Bias 23.7% 4.1% 19.6% 18.7% 
Note: The total misreporting bias within each column is estimated by the difference between the 
participations and the non-participations of the survey. The overall misreporting bias is estimated by 
the addition of all misreporting bias and is weighted for the number of MPs. 
Albeit the reported data clearly shows a misreporting bias, it is not clear 
whether the MPs have over- or underreported. Table 3 shows the comparison 
between the reported and the validated data at the individual level. 45.4% of MPs 
have given a consistent answer in the survey. Those MPs have reported their 
accurate behavior. In contrast, about the same share of MPs have overreported 
(41.3%), which means that have reported to submit more demands for evaluations 
than they have actually done. Finally, the share of MPs that have underreported is 
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relatively high (13.4%).17 Those MPs have neglected or reported fewer demands for 
evaluations than they have actually submitted.  
Table 3: Misreporting Bias: Overview of Over- und Underreporting (Frequency) 
 Validated Data   
Reported Data Never Once Several Times Total 
Never 34 (35.1%) 7 (7.2%) 2 (2.1%) 43 (44.3%) 
Once 15 (15.5%) 3 (3.1%) 4 (4.1%) 22 (22.7%) 
Several Times 17 (17.5%) 8 (8.3%) 7 (7.2%) 32 (33.0%) 
Total 66 (68.0%) 18 (18.6%) 13 (13.4%) 97 (100.0%) 
Note: 45.4% of the MPs have given a consistent response, 41.3% have over- and 13.4% have 
underreported. The percentages are estimated by adding the numbers of MP with the respective 
response.  
4.3 Misreporting: What Factors Explain Over- and Underreporting? 
As a next step, we will try to identify which determinants influence participation in 
the survey, as well as over- und underreporting in the survey. Table 4 presents the 
findings of the separate probit models for survey participation, over- and 
underreporting, as well as the findings of the Heckman selection models. Model 1 
illustrates the probit model to participate in the survey.  
 
 
17 The percentage of people who underreport their participation in elections is usually about 1% 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  21 
According to the model, the likelihood of MPs of left parties to participate in the 
survey is slightly significantly19 higher. This result is evident, since we have a slightly 
higher participation of left parties in the survey (Table 7). Since significance 
disappears for left parties in model 5, we have to assume that the effect is not robust. 
Hence, models 1 and 5 support the conclusion that the sample is not biased by self-
selection. 
Regarding the misreporting of MPs, both in terms of over- and underreporting, 
the models show different results. Model 2 shows that MPs with a highly positive 
attitude towards evaluations have a 53%20 higher probability to overreport than those 
parliamentarians with a negative attitude (Figure 2). Not surprisingly, MPs that have 
submitted a parliamentary intervention to demand an evaluation have a lower 
probability to overreport – since they cannot overreport when they have truly 
performed the action in question.  
The results for underreporting are contrasting (Model 3). The more negative the 
attitude towards evaluations, the higher the MPs’ likelihood to underreport. In 
addition, women tend to underreport less than their male colleagues (Figure 3). 
However, the gender effect dissolves with a positive attitude towards evaluations. 
Evidence from other domains is ambiguous: Whereas research in epidemiology 
shows conform findings that women are less prone to social desirability effects 
(Hebert et al. 1997; Ambwani and Chmielewski 2013), literature from business 
studies presents opposite or inconclusive results (Chung and Monroe 2003; Murphy 
 
 
19 Since we have a full sample, a significance test is less important and even disputed in literature 
(Behnke, 2005). 
20 First differences, 95% confidence interval. 
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2012). A convincing theoretical explanation is missing, which explains why women 
with a negative attitude towards evaluations underreport less than men. Since female 
MPs are overall younger, have a shorter experience in parliament, are less 
established politicians, and belong more often to the French speaking and to the left 
wing parties than their male colleagues, a spurious correlation seems to be the most 
obvious explanation for this finding. Furthermore, the submission of a parliamentary 
intervention has a highly significant influence on the likelihood to underreport. This 
is again not surprising, since submitting an intervention is a precondition for 
underreporting. 
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Survey Overreporting for the Attitude towards Evaluation21  







21 The scale of the attitude towards evaluations ranges from 1 (negative) to 4 (positive) 
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Survey Underreporting for the Attitude towards Evaluation  
and the Gender 
 
The Heckman models 4 and 5 show similar results. This means that omitting for 
the survey participation does not lead to an inconsistent estimation for over- and 
underreporting. Since the likelihood ratio tests of the independent equations are not 
significant, we do not have to control for selection. 
 
4.4 The Effects of Self-selection and Misreporting 
Finally, we will reconstruct the analysis of Bundi (2016) that investigates the 
determinants for the MPs’ demand for evaluations (Table 5). In doing so, we 
compare the findings for the reported evaluation demand (Model 6) and the 
validated evaluation demand (Model 7). The table shows that almost all effects 
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Table 5: Determinates for Reported and Validated Evaluation Demand  
 Reported Evaluation Demand Validated Evaluation Demand 





































N 93 93 
Chi2 20.78 10.49 
p 0.008 0.234 
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.091 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Regression coefficients shown with robust standard biases in 
parentheses. 
report an evaluation demand, however, this effect disappears on the validated 
demand for policy evaluation.  
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The model shows that the attitude towards evaluation has a highly significant 
influence on whether a MP reports an evaluation demand (Figure 4). However, the 
attitude and the gender have no influence on the actual behavior. MPs with a 
negative attitude towards evaluations do not significantly demand fewer evaluations 
than those MPs with a positive attitude (Figure 5). Since model estimation 6 over-
performs model 7 clearly, we can conclude that common explanatory variables are 
better in explaining evaluation demand reporting than actual evaluation demand.  






23 Reference categories: mean age, mean bureaucratic drift, mean professionalization, mean parliament 
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4.5 Discussion: Is the Attitude the Key to Explain Misreporting?   
The analysis shows that the attitude towards the object, in our case the evaluation, 
has an influence on the survey results. Since the MPs’ attitude towards evaluations 
influences overreporting in a positive and underreporting in negative way, the 
overall analysis is biased. The question is why attitude has such an influence on 
misreporting and how we can deal with this instance. It is often argued in literature 
that social desirability and memory failure are the reason for misreporting. How are 
these concepts linked to the attitude towards the object of research?  
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According to Krumpal (2013, 2018), social desirability refers to the tendency of 
the respondents to agree to socially desirable attitudes. Either social desirability 
appears when a respondent refers to a characteristic to receive approval of somebody 
(interviewee, peers, general public, etc.) or when a survey item is especially 
susceptible to give socially desirable answers. Even though evaluation is not a 
particularly sensitive topic, the attitude towards it can nevertheless influence the 
survey responses. We argue that the attitude interacts with social desirability and 
memory failure. A person with a more positive attitude will more likely feel the 
pressure to overreport due to social desirability. In contrast, the effect for a person 
with a more negative attitude goes in the opposite direction, since the person cares 
less about the objective and is more susceptible to memory failures. Therefore, the 
person will less likely overreport, in fact even underreport due to the circumstance 
that he or she may underestimate his or her activity, due to a lack of memory. As a 
consequence, a negative attitude can theoretically influence memory failure.  
To sum up, we argue that scholars have to pay attention to the attitude towards 
the object of a survey, since the attitude may influence the reporting of this activity. 
A positive attitude interacts with social desirability and fosters overreporting, while 
a negative attitude has an influence on memory failure and leads to underreporting.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this article, we have reviewed the methodological challenges of legislative surveys, 
namely sampling, participation, response and misreporting biases (Traugott and 
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Karosh, 1979; Belli et al., 1999; Groves et al., 2002, Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012). In 
particular, we have focused on the self-selection and misreporting biases as they 
represent crucial issues for legislative surveys. The aim of this study was to measure 
empirically the scope of both biases, their antecedents and their effects on the 
validity of legislative survey responses. In order to study survey biases in a 
legislative context, the article compared the MPs’ responses to a survey with their 
actual behavior in the parliament. The results indicate that survey responses are 
indeed biased. While self-selection does not seem to be a major problem in legislative 
surveys, misreporting is of a greater relevance. The attitude towards the object of a 
survey can highly influence the MPs’ responses on this object. In our empirical 
illustration based on MPs’ demands for policy evaluations, MPs with a more positive 
attitude towards evaluations have overreported, while MPs with a more negative 
attitude have underreported. We conclude that scholars should be careful when 
interpreting survey results, since the attitude is strongly linked to social desirability.  
This study has some limitations. First, the number of observations is rather 
small to obtain robust results. Although our dataset provides a full sample of all 
Swiss MPs at the federal level, the number of studied MPs should ideally be 
increased to produce more reliable findings. Second, our dataset suggests that one 
can rather focus on the misreporting bias then on the self-selection bias. Albeit this 
makes it easier for the survey researcher to concentrate on a specific methodological 
problem, the data also shows that the underreporting percentage is much higher 
compared to other types of surveys, such as postelection or household panel surveys. 
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Thus, scholars relying on legislative surveys have to deal not only with 
overreporting, but also with underreporting. Underreporting is a well-known 
challenge in elite surveys, in particular when the respondents have rather a high 
status amongst the participants (Fowler et al., 2011, 456) or the answer is sensitive 
(Corstange, 2008, 45). In the case of our empirical illustration, MPs may have 
underreported as a result of different understandings of the object of the survey (e.g. 
“evaluation”). Despite the fact that we provided an explicit definition for “evaluation” 
in the questionnaire to reduce this problem, we cannot entirely exclude that MPs 
may have responded with a different definition of the concept in mind. Last, the 
attitude towards an object cannot only influence responses on the object itself, but 
also the participation. However, we cannot empirically analyze this question, since 
we lack information on the attitude of the MPs that did not participate in the survey. 
A possibility for further application would be to estimate the attitude towards 
evaluations, with the limitations that some MPs might have no attitude at all.  
This article has made an important contribution to understand how 
methodological issues can influence the results of a legislative survey. In legislative 
research, literature indicates that the role of legislatives may increase in the future 
and will be more studied (Beichelt, 2012; Winzen, 2013; Russel, Gover and Wollter 
2015). Since the number of legislative surveys will most likely increase as a 
consequence, scholars should pay attention to the validity of survey results. In this 
regard, our article is a helpful starting point in the study of the methodological 
challenges of legislative surveys. While our analyses provide limited conclusions 
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regarding social desirability and memory failure, we hope to stimulate more studies 
digging deeper into the phenomenon of MPs’ misreporting.  
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7 Appendix 
Table 6: Operationalization of the Variables 
Variable Operationalization Source 
Dependent Variable   
Reported Evaluation 
Demand 
In the last four years, In which policy fields did you 
propose a parliamentary request in order to examine 





All the types of parliamentary instruments available 
to federal MPs (questions, interpellations, 
postulates, motions and parliamentary initiatives) 
introduced in the four years previous to the survey 
Content Analysis 
Independent Variable   
Gender Gender of the MP 
Dummy: 0 for male, 1 for female 
Legislative Survey, supp. 
Age Age of MP in years 
Continous scale 
Legislative Survey, supp. 
Language Spoken Language of the MP 
Dummy: 0 for German, 1 for Latin (French and 
Italian) 
Legislative Survey, supp. 
Parliamentary Group Parliamentary Group of the MP 
Categorial scale: 1 for right parties (Swiss People's 
Party, Ticino League, Geneva Citizens' Movement, 
Independent), 2 for center parties (FDP.The Liberals, 
Christian Democratic People's Party, Green Liberal 
Party, Conservative Democratic Party, Evangelical 
People's Party, Christian Social Party) and 3 for left 
parties (Social Democratic Party, Green Party) 
Legislative Survey, supp. 
 
Evaluation Attitude Index of three dimensions: 
- During the last four years, how many times did 
you read an evaluation summary? 
Legislative Survey 
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- Evaluations are a useful instrument for me as a 
member of parliament. 
- Whenever possible, my political decisions are 
supported by evaluation or other studies. 
Categorical scale: 1 (never/strongly disagree) - 4 
(frequently/strongly agree) 
Professionalization Over the last year, what is the amount of time spent 
for your parliament mandate, in  
percentage of a full-time job? 
Continuous scale 
Legislative Survey 
Bureaucratic Drift Generally, the administration implements the 
legislation within the meaning of the parliament. 
Dummy: 0 for agree, 1 for disagree 
Legislative Survey 




Oversight Committee Membership in an oversight committee 
Dummy: 0 for no, 1 for yes 
Legislative Survey 
Parliament Board Membership in the parliament office 
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Table 7: General Self-Selection Bias 
 Invited to the  
Survey (N=245) 
Participated in the  
Survey (N=112) 
Party   
Swiss People's Party 58 (23.7%) 21 (18.8%) 
Social Democratic Party 57 (23.3%) 32 (28.6%) 
FDP.The Liberals 41 (16.7%) 18 (16.1%) 
Christian Democratic People's Party 42 (17.1%) 19 (17.0%) 
Other 47 (19.2%) 22 (19.6%) 
Gender   
Male 174 (71.0%) 74 (66.1%) 
Female 71 (29.0%) 38 (33.9%) 
Language   
German 177 (72.2%) 77 (68.8%) 
French 57 (23.3%) 28 (25.0%) 
Italian 11 (4.5%) 7 (6.3%) 
Age (in years)   
< 35 15 (6.1%) 8 (7.1%) 
35-49 62 (25.3%) 29 (25.9%) 
50-64 141 (57.6%) 60 (53.6%) 
> 64 27 (11.0%) 15 (13.4%) 
Parliament Seniority (in years)   
< 4 91 (37.1%) 45 (40.2%) 
4-7 61 (24.9%) 29 (25.9%) 
8-11 44 (18.0%) 15 (13.4%) 
> 11 49 (20.0%) 23 (20.5%) 
Committee   
Legislative 152 (62.0%) 68 (60.7%) 
Oversight 93 (38.0%) 44 (39.3%) 
Parliamentary Interventions   
< 10 47 (19.2%) 23 (20.5%) 
10-19 65 (26.5%) 31 (27.7%) 
20-29 45 (18.4%) 20 (17.9%) 
> 30 88 (35.9%) 38 (33.9%) 
Reading example: 71 female MPs were invited to the survey, which refers to 29.0% of all contacted MPs. 
38 female MPs have participated in the survey, which refers to 33.9% of all contacted MPs. Hence, 
female MPs are slightly overrepresented in the survey sample (29.0% < 33.9%) 
 
